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We introduce a logic modelling some aspects of the behaviour of the measurement process, in such a
way that no direct mention of quantum states is made, thus avoiding the problems associated to this
rather evasive notion. We then study some properties of the models of this logic, and deduce some
characteristics that any model (and hence, any formulation of quantum mechanics compatible with its
predictions and relying on a notion of measurement) should verify. The main results we obtain are that
in the case of a Hilbert space of dimension at least 3, using a strengthening of the Kochen-Specker
theorem, we show that no model can lead to the certain prediction of more than one atomic outcome.
Moreover, if the Hilbert space is finite dimensional, then we are able to precisely describe the structure
of the predictions of any model of our logic. In particular, we show that all the models of our logic do
exactly make the same predictions regarding whether a given sequence of outcomes is possible or
not, so that quantum mechanics can be considered complete as long as the possibility of outcomes is
considered.
As Jaynes puts it so vividly, “our present [quantum mechanical] formalism is not purely epistemologi-
cal; it is a peculiar mixture describing in part realities of Nature, in part incomplete human information
about Nature – all scrambled up by Heisenberg and Bohr into an omelette that nobody has seen how to
unscramble” [11].
One origin for theses difficulties is, in our opinion, the excessive reliance of the quantum mechanical
formalism on the evasive notion of quantum state. Indeed, in most standard textbooks on quantum
mechanics, the presentation of the theory starts with the postulate of its existence, and the rest of the
exposition of the theory, including the important mechanism of measure, is based on this very notion.
But, we insist, the existence of the quantum state is only postulated, so that the latter is an just abstract
mathematical entity with no direct experimental counterpart, and hence doesn’t have a clear status between
being ontological or epistemological. This causes the aforementioned difficulties of interpretation which
spread to other notions, such as that of measurement and the associated “measurement problem”.
Yet, experimentally, the actual data that are obtained and dealt with are solely measurement outcomes
and, in practice, any prediction regarding quantum mechanics is expressed in terms of measurement
outcomes. This suggests, in order to gain a better understanding of quantum mechanics, to reverse the
perspective by considering measurement outcomes as the primary component of the theory, instead of
quantum states. This, of course, is not a new position regarding quantum mechanics. For instance, in [16],
Rovelli states that “one can take the view that outcomes of measurements are the physical content of the
theory, and the quantum state is a secondary theoretical construction” and refers back to Heisenberg and
Bohr.
In this article, we introduce an approach using the tools of formal logic and based on a relation,
denoted Mes(s,O, p, t), which intended meaning is that a system labelled by s has been measured with an
observable O , yielding outcome p, and that t labels the resulting system. We shall, for instance, consider
the statement
∀s,O, t, Mes(s,O, p, t) =⇒ ∃O ′,u : Mes(t,O ′, p,u) (1)
which indicates that outcome p is always possible when measuring a system (labelled here by t) obtained
by a measurement which itself yielded outcome p. Here, the part “Mes(s,O, p, t)” can be interpreted as
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a preparation phase, with t labelling the prepared system, and “∃O ′,u : Mes(t,O ′, p,u)” is a prediction
regarding this prepared system.
Another typical example is the following, where p and q are two mutually orthogonal outcomes:
∀s,O, t, Mes(s,O, p, t) =⇒ ¬(∃O ′,u : Mes(t,O ′,q,u)) (2)
This corresponds to the fact that one cannot obtain two mutually orthogonal outcomes p and q in a row
when measuring the same system. If this statement is true for any q orthogonal to p, this impossibility
can also be expressed by saying that if t has been prepared by Mes(s,O p, t), then p is a certain outcome
for t: measuring it with an observable having p as possible outcome will certainly yield outcome p, since
equation (2) states that any other outcome is impossible.
If we drop the labels refering to the systems and the observables, the previous two propositions can be
interpreted as follows: the former corresponds to the fact that the sequence of outcomes (p, p) is possible
while the latter reflects the impossibility of the sequence (p,q) as soon as p and q are orthogonal.
Let us point out that we intentionally leave probabilities aside and only focus on the possibility or
impossibility of obtaining a particular outcome. To that respect, an outcome p is impossible (resp. certain,
possible) if its probability equals 0 (resp. equals 1, is nonzero). Our approach can be seen as a possibilistic
one, using the term coined by Fritz [8].
Our study will proceed as follows. First, we shall identify some properties involving the “Mes” relation,
and we will use quantum states so as to ensure that these properties are compatible with the prediction
of quantum mechanics. However, we insist again on the fact that in the end, the obtained properties
will be expressed using the “Mes” construction only, so that there remains no reference whatsoever to
quantum states. We will then study the way one can assign some meaning, some semantics to these
sentences, which is called a model of the theory [10, 13, 14]. Obviously, the orthodox formulation of
quantum mechanics based on quantum states will provide such a model but, more generally, any theory
attempting to formalize quantum mechanics (and compatible with its predictions) and involving a notion
of measurement shall lead to a model of this logical theory. Thus, the study of these models will allow
us to address some questions such as whether the “standard” model (based on quantum states) has any
particular status, or whether there exists other models leading to different possibilistic predictions.
A note on the formalism In this article, we will only consider projective measurements. Such a
measurement can be written as ∑iλiΠi with ∑iΠi = 1H and ∀ i, j, ΠiΠ j = δi, jΠi, i.e. with each Πi being
an orthogonal projector on some closed subspace. Moreover, following a logical approach, we will focus
on the eigenspaces of such a projective measurement, rather on its eigenvalues.
Formally, given a Hilbert spaceH (or, more precisely, a Hilbert lattice L(H ) consisting of the closed
subspaces ofH ) or, more generally, an orthomodular lattice L, we define a (finite) observable of L as a
finite subset O = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} of L such that
∀ i, pi 6=⊥ ∀ i 6= j, pi ≤ pj⊥ and
n∨
i=1
pi =>
In the case where L is the lattice L(H ) associated to a Hilbert spaceH , this definition corresponds to
the set of eigenspaces of a Hermitian operator with finitely many eigenvalues. We invite the reader to
refer to [5, 17, 18] for further informations on these algebraic structures. In the following,M (L) will
denote the set of finite observables of L.
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Furthermore, according to modern treatments of quantum mechanics (especielly in the field of quantum
information and quantum computation), the most general kind of measurement one can perform on a
quantum system is a P.O.V.M. [4, 15] and not a mere projective measurement. However, Neumark’s
theorem tells us that any P.O.V.M. can be realized by extending the used Hilbert space to a larger one, and
then performing a projective measurement on this larger space. As a consequence, it is sufficient to only
consider projective measurements in our formal study1.
1 A Logic for Measurement
Let us return to the statement that if a quantum system is measured twice in a row, one cannot obtain two
mutually orthogonal outcomes, regardless which observables were measured, i.e. if q≤ p⊥, then
∀s,O, t, Mes(s,O, p, t) =⇒ ¬(∃O ′,u : Mes(t,O ′,q,u)) (3)
This obviously holds in orthodox quantum mechanics for projective measurements, as a consequence
of the Born rule and the projection postulate. More precisely, if a system labelled by s is in a state |ϕ〉,
and if Mes(s, p, t), then Πp|ϕ〉 6= |0〉 (otherwise outcome p would not be possible) and the state |ψ〉 of t
is colinear to Πp|ϕ〉. Now, since q≤ p⊥, this implies that ΠqΠp = 0, so that Πq|ψ〉= |0〉 and hence q is
not a possible outcome. Here, for p ∈ L(H ), Πp obviously denotes the orthogonal projection on p.
We insist again on the fact that even though the justification of (3) relies on the notion of quantum
states, it is stated in such a way that does not involve those: it is a statement regarding measurement
outcomes only, and the previous justification ensures that it is consistent with the predictions of orthodox
quantum mechanics. This first property suggests the following definition:
Definition 1 (Verification Statement). For all p ∈ L and s ∈ S, we define sI p by2
sI p ∆⇐⇒ ¬(∃O, t : Mes(s,O, p⊥, t))
In that case, we will say that s verifies p.
With this definition, statement (3) becomes
∀ p,s,O, t,q, p≤ q and Mes(s,O, p, t) =⇒ t I q (4)
Let us explore some other properties regarding measurements.
Valid Outcomes The least element ⊥ of L (if L is a Hilbert lattice, this corresponds to the nullspace
{|0〉}) cannot be obtained as an outcome, that is
∀s,O, t, ¬Mes(s,O,⊥, t).
Moreover, ⊥ is the only element of L which cannot be obtained as an outcome:
∀ p, (∀s,O, t, ¬Mes(s,O, p, t)) =⇒ p =⊥
Equivalently, these statements can be expressed respectively as ∀s, sI> and ∀ p 6=>, ∃s : ¬(sI p).
1Actually, the rigorous logical treatment of composite quantum systems and their formal counterparts goes far beyond the
scope of this article, and will be developped in a future article.
2A “∆” on top of an equality or an equivalence indicates a definition.
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Measurability Any system is likely to be measured, so that for every system s and for every observ-
able O , at least one outcome has to be possible, which we temporarily write as
∀s,O, ∃ p, t : Mes(s,O, p, t). (5)
Possibilistic Noncontextuality The next property can be expressed as follows: If an outcome p is
certain (resp. impossible) if measuring s with a particular observable containing p, then it is also certain
(resp. impossible) if measuring s with any observable containing p. In orthodox quantum mechanics, this
observation follows from the Born rule, which states that the probability of obtaining an outcome p when
measuring a quantum system in normalized state |ϕ〉 is 〈ϕ|Πp|ϕ〉. In particular, this probability does not
dependent on which observable is actually measured, so that in our possibilistic approach, the impossibility
or certainty of an outcome (corresponding to probabilities 0 and 1, respectively) is independent of the
measured observable. We call this property possibilistic noncontextuality, where noncontextuality refers
to the independence w.r.t. which observable is measured, and possibilistic to the fact that we only consider
the noncontextuality of certain and impossible properties. This should not be confused the stronger notion
of noncontextuality usually associated to results such as the Kochen-Specker theorem. Let us derive some
consequences from this property.
First, suppose that p,q ∈ L are such that p ≤ q, that s I p and let us consider observable O =
{p,q⊥, p⊥∧q}. With the assumption that sI p, measuring s with observable O would yield outcome p
with certainty (as both q⊥ and q∧ p⊥ are lower that p⊥) so that q⊥ is not possible and, from noncontextu-
ality, it is not possible to obtain q⊥ as outcome when measuring s (regardless of the measured observable),
i.e. s verifies q. We thus have shown than
∀ p≤ q, ∀s, sI p =⇒ sI q. (6)
Suppose now that p,q ∈ L are compatible, that s I p and s I q and consider observable O =
{p∧q, p⊥, p∧q⊥}. Measuring s with O would yield p∧q with certainty since p⊥ is orthogonal to p and
is thus impossible as follows from sI p, and p∧q⊥ is also impossible, being orthogonal to q. But again,
p∧q is also certain if measuring s with observable O ′ = {p∧q,(p∧q)⊥} so that (p∧q)⊥ is impossible
w.r.t. O ′ and, using noncontextuality a last time, w.r.t. any observable. Thus, we have
∀ p C q, ∀s, sI p and sI q =⇒ sI p∧q. (7)
This property can be stated in a simpler way, using the Sasaki projection3. Indeed, if s I p and s I q
(without the assumption that they are compatible), then sI p∨q⊥ so that sI q∧ (p∨q⊥) since q and
p∨q⊥ are compatible. As a consequence, equation 7 can equivalently be stated as
∀ p,q ∈ L, ∀s, sI p and sI q =⇒ sI p & q.
Possibilistic noncontextuality allows us to reexpress some previous properties in a simpler way. For
instance, using (6), equation (4) can be replaced by
∀s,O, p, t, Mes(s,O, p, t) =⇒ t I p.
Similarly, measurability can be expressed as ∀s,O, ¬(∀ p ∈ O, sI p⊥). But an observable O ∈M (L) is
a finite collection of mutually orthogonal (and hence compatible) elements of L so that, from equation (7),
we deduce (∀ p ∈ O, sI p⊥) ⇐⇒ sI∧{p⊥ ∣∣ p ∈ O} ⇐⇒ sI⊥
Thus, measurability simply becomes: ∀s, ¬(sI⊥).
3The Sasaki projection is defined as p & q ∆= q∧ (p∨q⊥) and is the lattice-theoretical equivalent of the orthogonal projection.
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Compatible Preservation We now present a last property, relating the verification of properties before
and after a measurement. In order to express it, let us first translate verification statements in terms of
quantum states. An outcome p⊥ is impossible for a system in state |ϕ〉 if its probability is 0, that is, using
the Born rule, if Πp⊥ |ϕ〉= |0〉. This means that if s is in state |ϕ〉, then that one has4 sI p ⇐⇒ |ϕ〉 ∈ p.
Suppose then that sI p and Mes(s,O,q, t) with p and q compatible. System t is then in a state |ψ〉
colinear to Πq|ϕ〉. But having sI p means that |ϕ〉 ∈ p so that Πp|ϕ〉= |ϕ〉, and the compatibility of p
and q means that Πp and Πq commute. As a consequence, ΠpΠq|ϕ〉=ΠqΠp|ϕ〉=Πq|ϕ〉 and, similarly,
Πp|ψ〉= |ψ〉 so that t I p. This shows that the following property is compatible with the predictions of
orthodox quantum mechanics:
∀ p C q, ∀s,O, t, sI p and Mes(s,O,q, t) =⇒ t I p
We call this compatible preservation since the verification of an element p ∈ L is preserved during
a measurement, provided that its outcome q is compatible with p. Again, considering possibilistic
noncontextuality, this statement can be rewritten as
∀ p,q, ∀s,O, t, sI p and Mes(s,O,q, t) =⇒ t I p & q
We summarize all these properties by defining the following logical theory:
Definition 2. Given an orthomodular lattice L, we define TL as the theory consisting of the following
axioms and axiom schemata:
∀s, sI> (8a)
∀s, ¬(sI⊥) (8b)
for all p 6=> ∃s : ¬(sI p) (8c)
for all p,q ∈ L such that p≤ q, ∀s, sI p =⇒ sI q (8d)
for all p,q ∈ L, ∀s, sI p and sI q =⇒ sI p & q (8e)
for all p,q ∈ L, ∀s, ∀ t, sI p and Mes(s,q, t) =⇒ t I p & q (8f)
2 Models
All the axioms that constitute TL are only sequences of characters, i.e. syntactical objects. They describe
in mathematical terms some properties that “Mes” should verify. In order to give assign a meaning to
these sentences, we need to consider a structure made of a set A, called the universe and a relation M
reflecting the syntactical construction “Mes(s,O, p, t)”. Let us first note that this construction actually
only appears in the form “∃O : Mes(s,O, p, t)”, so that M can in fact be defined as a ternary relation
on A×L×A, any explicit reference to an observable being unnecessary. It can also be remarked that
such a structure (A,M) can be seen as a labelled directed graph, with A being its set of vertices, and with
(a, p,b) ∈M denoting an arrow from a to b labelled by p ∈ L.
Intuitively, a graph G= (A,M) verifies a sentence ϕ if and only if the graph verifies the translation of
ϕ in terms of A and M. In this case, we write G |= ϕ . For instance, one has
G |= ∀ p ∈ L, ∀s, t, (∃O : Mes(s,O, p, t)) =⇒ ∃O ′,u : Mes(t,O ′, p,u)
if and only if it is true that ∀ p ∈ L, ∀a,b ∈ A, M(a, p,b) =⇒ ∃c ∈ A : M(b, p,c).
4This “translation” will become clearer and more rigourous once we have introduced model-theoretic elements.
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Definition 3. A graph G= (A,M) is a model of TL if and only if it verifies every axiom of TL. In that
case, we write G |=TL.
While TL is a set of syntactical elements, a model of TL is an actual set equipped with an actual
relation, i.e. an actual directed graph labelled by elements of L in which the properties expressed by TL
do hold. With such a model, elements of A can be seen as specifications of quantum states. To illustrate
this, let us first introduce the model corresponding to the orthodox approach to quantum mechanics.
Definition 4 (Hilbert Graph). Given a Hilbert spaceH , we define the Hilbert graph HH = (AH,MH) by
putting
AH
∆
=
{|ϕ〉 ∈H ∣∣ ∥∥|ϕ〉∥∥= 1} and MH(|ϕ〉, p, |ψ〉) ∆⇐⇒ ∥∥Πp|ϕ〉∥∥ 6= 0 and |ψ〉= Πp|ϕ〉∥∥Πp|ϕ〉∥∥
Proposition 1. For every Hilbert spaceH , HH |=TL(H ).
This result is the direct consequence of the fact that quantum states are actually the basic model
of quantum mechanics, and that TL has been defined considering quantum states. We recall that the
verification relation I translates in this model as |ϕ〉IH p ⇐⇒ |ϕ〉 ∈ p.
However, elements of the universe of a model can also be uncomplete descriptions of a state. To
illustrate this, we introduce another important model of TL.
Definition 5 (Lattice Graph). Given an orthomodular lattice L, the lattice graph LL = (AL,ML) is defined
by AL
∆
= L? (with L? ∆= L\{⊥}) and ML(a, p,b) ∆⇐⇒ b≤ a & p.
Proposition 2. Given an orthomodular lattice L, LL |=TL.
Proof. Let us first remark that aIL p ⇐⇒ a≤ p. With this in mind, it is easy to prove that the different
sentences of TL do hold. For instance, sentences (8a) and (8b) simply state that ∀a ∈ L?, ⊥< a≤>. The
other formulas can also be proven with no difficulties.
The way TL was designed – with a single relation “Mes” indicating the possibility of obtaining a
specified outcome – implies that any interpretation of quantum mechanics that includes a notion of mea-
surement should, in order to comply with the predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics (corresponding
in our approach to the model HH ), lead to a model of TL for some orthomodular lattice L.
Consider for instance the classical example introduced by Bell in [1]: a system, made of two spin
one-half particles A and B, is assumed to have its state completely specified by a parameter λ belonging
to some set Λ. Measuring the spin of particle A along direction ~a yields outcome A(~a,λ ) ∈ {+1,−1}
and, similarly, measuring B along direction~b yields outcome B(~b,λ ). Such an approach would provide a
model B of TL(C2⊗C2), with Λ as its universe. And even though the relation M is yet unspecified, we can
however express some verification statements: for all~a and~b,
λ IB [A(λ ,~a)]⊗ [B(λ ,~b)]
where [A(λ ,~a)] (resp. [B(λ ,~b)]) denotes the eigenspace corresponding to the indicated outcome.
Thus, the study of the models of TL provides a general framework for understanding the meaning of
the notion of quantum state and for determining the different ways of specifying (either completely or
partially) the state of a quantum system.
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Before continuing, let us make a remark about the definition of our logic and, in particular, the property
of possibilistic noncontextuality from which we have deduced equations (7) and (8e). The two models we
have presented so far, HH and LL , both verify
∀ p,q ∈ L, ∀a ∈ A, aIG p and aIG q =⇒ aIG p∧q (9)
i.e. both verify a version of equations (7) where the compatibility requirement has been removed. Thus,
one might wonder whether (9) could be used instead of (7) and (8e). Translated in terms of the “Mes”
relation, it states that if a is such that if no outcome orthogonal to p or q can be obtained when measuring
a quantum system in a state modelled by a, then no outcome orthogonal to p∧q can be obtained either.
But this is rather peculiar, since if p and q are not compatible, this relates the outcomes of necessarily
distinct observables, so that equation (9) seems rather ad hoc and unnatural.
On the contrary, if we add the requirement that p and q are compatible, then we have seen during
the justification of equation (7) that one could deduce, considering a single observable, the certainty of
outcome p∧q.
However, we will show later that under some reasonable conditions which will be detailed later,
equation (9) is necessarily verified by any model of TL.
3 Sasaki Filters
We shall now present some results regarding the set of those properties verified by an element of a model
of TL. Formally, given such a model G= (A,M), we define the set of properties verified by a ∈ A as
[[a]]G =
{
p ∈ L ∣∣ aIG p}
We can first remark that [[a]]G is a consistent Sasaki filter of L. We recall that given an orthomodular
lattice, a Sasaki filter [2, 3] of L is a subset F ⊆ L verifying the following three properties:
1. Non-empty: F 6= /0
2. Upper set: p ∈ F and p≤ q =⇒ q ∈ F
3. &-Stability: p,q ∈ F =⇒ p & q ∈ F
It is moreover consistent if ⊥ 6∈ F , i.e. if F 6= L. The verification of these properties by a [[a]]G is a
direct consequence of the definition of TL, and follow from axioms (8a), (8b), (8d) and (8e). We also
recall the following theorem from [2, 3], and an immediate consequence of it:
Theorem 3. IfH is a Hilbert space of dimension at least 3, then every consistent Sasaki filter of L(H )
contains at most one atom, i.e. one vector ray.
Corollary 4. If G= (A,M) is a model of TL(H ) with dimH ≥ 3, then for all a ∈ A, [[a]]G contains at
most one vector ray.
This result has important consequences. Recall the possibility of having a hidden-variable model of
TL as the one sketched earlier after Bell’s article. The previous corollary simply forbids such a model,
since it would lead to the presence of more than one atom in a consistent Sasaki filter. For instance,
with the previous notations, given any two non-colinear and non-orthogonal vectors~u and~v, we had for
all λ ∈ Λ,
λ IB [A(λ ,~u)]⊗ [B(λ ,~u)] and λ IB [A(λ ,~v)]⊗ [B(λ ,~v)]
which is precisely ruled out by corollary 4. More generally, this result rules out models where there
exists at least one element in the universe of the model which verifies two distinct atomic outcomes. This
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includes (but is not restricted to) models involving counterfactual definiteness, and constructions such as
the one presented by Bell. We can also derive the following result, which implies the Kochen-Specker
theorem [12, 9].
Corollary 5. IfH verifies 3≤ dimH , there is no model G= (A,M) of TL(H ) such that there exists an
element a ∈ A verifying
∀O ∈M (L(H )), ∃ p ∈ O : aIG p
This shows that theorem 3 is actually stronger that the Kochen-Specker theorem, since the assumption of
noncontextuality has been replaced by possibilistic noncontextuality.
Another important consequence relates to the position and momentum of a particle. Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle teaches us that the position and the momentum of a particle cannot be known
simultaneously. Theorem 3 actually goes further, by stating that no model compatible with the predictions
of orthodox quantum mechanics can simultaneously specify the position and the momentum of a particle,
independently of whether these position and momentum are known (whatever is meant by being known).
4 A Representation Theorem in Finite Dimension
We now present another result regarding the models of TL(H ) which applies to Hilbert spacesH such
that 3≤ dimH < ∞. Let us start by some elementary bilinear algebra. For legibility reasons, elements
of L(H ) will be denoted using capital letters and vectors with lowercase letters even though previously,
elements of an orthomodular lattice were denoted using lowercase letters. Moreover, for P ∈ L(H ) (so
that it is a closed subspace ofH ), let ΠP denotes the orthogonal projection on P.
Proposition 6. Given two closed subspaces P and Q of a Hilbert space, the restriction to P of ΠP ◦ΠQ,
denoted ΠP ◦ΠQ|P, is self-adjoint.
As a consequence, ifH is finite dimensional, which we will now assume, then P admits an orthonor-
mal basis made of eigenvectors of ΠP ◦ΠQ|P. It directly follows that:
Proposition 7. Two subspaces P and Q are compatible if, and only if the spectrum of ΠP ◦ΠQ|P verifies
sp(ΠP ◦ΠQ|P)⊆ {0,1}.
Let now G= (A,M) be a model of TL(H ). If we define [[a]]G&
# Q =
{
P & Q
∣∣ P ∈ [[a]]G}, it is clear
from axiom (8f) that if M(a,P,b), then [[a]]G&
# P⊆ [[b]]G.
Proposition 8. If P and Q are two distinct incompatible elements of [[a]]G, then neither P nor Q are
minimal in [[a]]G.
Proof. From the previous discussion, if P and Q are incompatible, then there exists an eigenvector u of
ΠP ◦ΠQ|P associated with an eigenvalue λ 6∈ {0,1}. As a consequence, by defining v =ΠQ(u), we have
u 6∈ Q and v 6∈ P. One can note moreover that ΠP(v) = λu. Let us now define C = span(u,v). Having
λ 6= 0, one can write
C = span(λu,v−λu) = span(ΠP(v),v−ΠP(v))
so that C is compatible with P, having ΠP(v) ∈ P and v−ΠP(v) ∈ P⊥. This implies that P &C = P∧C =
span
(
ΠP(v)
)
= span(u). Similarly, one can write C = span(v,u− v) = span(ΠQ(u),u−ΠQ(u)) so that
C is compatible with Q and thus Q &C = span(v).
As a consequence, [[a]]G &
# C contains two distinct vector rays – namely span(u) and span(v) – so
that, following theorem 3, there is no b ∈ A such that [[a]]G&# C ⊆ [[b]]G. As a consequence, there is no
92 Quantum Measurements from a Logical Point of View
b ∈ A verifying M(a,C,b), implying that C⊥ ∈ [[a]]G. Finally, since [[a]]G is a Sasaki filter, it also contains
C⊥& P so that P is not minimal in [[a]]G:
C⊥& P = P∧ (C⊥∨P⊥) = P∧ (C∧P)⊥ = P∧ (span(u))⊥ < P
Similarly, [[a]]G also contains C
⊥& Q which is strictly smaller than Q.
Corollary 9. IfH is a Hilbert space such that 3 ≤ dimH < ∞ and G = (A,M) is a model of TL(H ),
then for all a ∈ A, [[a]]G contains at most one minimal element.
Now, sinceH is finite dimensional, L(H ) has a finite height so that any non-empty subset of L(H )
contains at least one minimal element. Combining this remark with the previous proposition, we obtain:
Theorem 10. Given a model G= (A,M) of TL(H ) where 3≤ dimH < ∞, for all a ∈ A, there exists an
element e(a) ∈ L(H ) such that [[a]]G = e(a)↑ =
{
p ∈ L(H ) ∣∣ e(a)≤ p}.
With this notation, it can be remarked that an outcome p is certain w.r.t. a∈ A if e(a)≤ p and possible
if p 6≤ e(a)⊥, and that if M(a, p,b), then e(b)≤ e(a)& p.
An important consequence of this result is that, as discussed earlier, if a IG p and a IG q, then
necessarily aIG p∧q since [[a]]G is such that [[a]]G ≤ p and [[a]]G ≤ q and hence [[a]]G ≤ p∧q. Expressed
another way, the previously discussed equation (9) is a theorem of TL(H ) if 3≤ dimH < ∞.
Another consequence is the following: in [7], Randall and Foulis called a “metaphysical disaster” the
fact that in quantum logic, the physical properties of a quantum system were usually put in one-to-one
correspondance with the set of experimental propositions, i.e. the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space.
In our approach, this correspondance directly follows from theorem 10, since the set [[a]]G of properties
associated to an element a of a model G can actually be represented by an element of the lattice L(H ),
namely by e(a).
5 Sequences of Measurement Outcomes
We end this article by investigating the following question: given an orthomodular lattice L and elements
p1, . . . , pn ∈ L, is it possible to obtain these elements as a sequence of successive outcomes when measuring
a quantum system? In terms of TL, the question becomes whether
TL |= ∃s0,O1,s1, . . . ,On,sn ∈ S : Mes(s0,O1, p1,s1) and · · · and Mes(sn−1,On, pn,sn)
and we will investigate the verification of such a sentence by the models ofTL. This suggests the following
definition.
Definition 6. Given a complete orthomodular lattice L and a model G = (A,M) of TL, we define the
language `(G) of G as the set of labels of paths of G. Formally, a word p = p1 p2 · · · pn on L (i.e. a
finite sequence of elements of L) is in `(G) if and only if there exists elements a0,a1, . . . ,an ∈ A such that
M(ak−1, pk,ak) for all k ∈ [[1,n]] (i.e. p is the label of path (a0,a1, . . . ,an)).
In that case, given a model G and a word p = p1 · · · pn, the previous question amounts to determining
whether p ∈ `(G). The answer does a priori depend on the model, which is extremely interesting as it
could provide a method for discriminating models. Indeed, suppose that a word p = p1 p2 · · · pn can occur
as a sequence of actual outcomes of a physical experiment, and that it does not belong to the language
`(G) of some model G. This would constitute a criteria for ruling out G as a correct model of quantum
mechanics. However, as we will see next, in the case of a Hilbert lattice L(H ) with 3≤ dimH < ∞, all
the models of TL(H ) do actually define the same language.
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Proposition 11. For any model G= (A,M) of TL(H ) with 3≤ dimH < ∞, one has `(G)⊆ `(LL(H )).
Proof. With the previous notation, if M(a, p,b) then e(b) ≤ e(a)& p. As a consequence, given p =
p1 p2 · · · pn ∈ `(G), let (a0, . . . ,an) be a path inG labelled by p, so that ∀k ∈ [[1,n]], M(ak−1, pk,ak). Then,
for all k ∈ [[1,n]], we have e(ak)≤ e(ak−1)& pk i.e. ML
(
e(ak−1), pk,e(ak)
)
. As a consequence, p is the
label in LH of the path
(
e(a0), . . . ,e(an)
)
, so that p ∈ `(LH ).
Let us now recall that elements of L(H ) are subspaces ofH , i.e. they are sets of vectors. In particular,
for all a, p ∈ L(H ), one has a & p = {Πp|ψ〉 ∣∣ |ψ〉 ∈ a}. As a consequence, if b ≤ a & p, then for all
|ϕ〉 ∈ b, there exists a |ψ〉 ∈ a such that |ϕ〉=Πp|ψ〉.
Proposition 12. One has `(LL(H ))⊆ `(HH ).
Proof. Let p = p1 p2 · · · pn ∈ `(LH ) and let (e0,e1, · · ·en) be a path labelled by p. Moreover, let |ϕn〉 be a
normalized element of en and define backwards |ϕn−1〉 ∈ en−1, . . . , |ϕ1〉 ∈ e1 and |ϕ0〉 ∈ e0 such that
∀k ∈ [[1,n]], |ϕk〉= Πpk |ϕk−1〉∥∥Πpk |ϕk−1〉∥∥
In that case, for all k, MH
(|ϕk−1〉, pk, |ϕk〉), so that p labels the path (|ϕ0〉, |ϕ1〉, · · · , |ϕn〉) in HH .
Proposition 13. For any model G= (A,M) of TL(H ) with 3≤ dimH < ∞, one has `(HH )⊆ `(G).
Proof. Let p= p1 p2 · · · pn be in `(HH), and let
(|ϕ0〉, |ϕ1〉, . . . , |ϕn〉) be a path of HH labelled by p. Since
G is a model of TL(H ) and span(|ϕ0〉) 6=⊥, there exists a−1 and a0 in A such that M
(
a−1,span(|ϕ0〉),a0
)
.
With the previous notations,
⊥< e(a0)≤ e(a−1)& span(|ϕ0〉)
But span(|ϕ0〉) is an atom of L(H ) and e(a−1)& span(|ϕ0〉) ≤ span(|ϕ0〉), so that e(a0) = span(|ϕ0〉).
Now, having Πp1 |ϕ0〉 6= |0〉 or, equivalently, p1 6≤ e(a0)⊥, there exists a1 ∈ A such that M(a0, p1,a1).
It verifies e(a1)≤ e(a0)& p1. But again, e(a0) is an atom, so that e(a0)& p1 is also an atom and hence
e(a1) = e(a0)& p1 = span(|ϕ0〉)& p1 = span
(
Πp1 |ϕ0〉
)
= span
(|ϕ1〉)
Iterating this process, it is possible to define elements a1, . . . ,an such that each time, M(ak−1, pk,ak) and
e(ak) = span
(|ϕk〉). As a consequence, the path (a0, . . . ,an) is labelled by p, so that p ∈ `(G).
To summarize these results, we have shown:
Theorem 14. If 3≤ dimH < ∞, then every model G of TL(H ) verifies `(G) = `
(
LL(H )
)
= `(HH).
This theorem states that the languages defined by the models of TL(H ) do only depend onH , as soon
as 3≤ dimH < ∞. If we denote this language `(H ), we have, considering LL(H ) and HH respectively:
∀ p1, . . . , pn ∈ L(H ), p1 p2 · · · pn ∈ `(H ) ⇐⇒ p1 & p2 & · · ·& pn 6=⊥
⇐⇒ ΠpnΠpn−1 · · ·Πp1 6= 0
In particular, considering the Hilbert model HH alone, a sequence of outcomes is possible if and only if
one can assign a quantum state to the starting system so that the quantum state of the last system (obtained
by successive orthogonal projections) is different from the null vector. To that respect, regarding the
possibility of sequences of outcomes, the description of a quantum system provided by quantum states is
complete, thus partially answering a decades-old question [6].
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6 Conclusion and Perspectives
In this article, we have introduced a logical formulation of quantum mechanics based solely on the
apparent behavior of the measurement process. The obtained logic, called TL, and the study of its models
do provide a general way to investigate properties of models of quantum mechanics. For instance, in the
case where the orthomodular lattice is the one associated to a Hilbert spaceH of dimension at least 3,
we have shown in theorem 3 that no model of TL(H ) can have any of its elements verify more than one
atomic property, thus ruling out a large class of hidden-variable models of quantum mechanics.
Moreover, if H is finite dimensional, it is possible to characterize precisely the structure of the
collection of those properties verified by a state. A consequence of this result, studied in section 5, is
that all the models of TL(H ) make exactly the same predictions regarding whether a given sequence of
outcomes is possible.
This article only initiates the study of the logic TL and the ensuing approach of quantum mechanics.
A first direction for future developments is the study of the possible extension of theorem 10 to infinite
dimensional Hilbert spaces. Another one would focus on the relation between the possibilistic approach
developped in this article and the probabilistic one. Obviously, any probabilistic approach can lead to a
possibilistic approach by considering whether the probability of an event is zero or one. But conversely,
given a possibilistic modelG= (A,M) ofTL, how can one assign probabilities to the obtention of outcome
p in a state a ∈ A?
A last important direction is the generalization of this approach to more complex settings. In the last
part of this article, we have only considered sequences of outcomes, which correspond to a single quantum
system being measured finitely many times in a row. An interesting and necessary generalization would
be to consider directed acyclic graphs, corresponding to composite quantum systems. This would, in
particular, provide a way to study entanglement and, hopefully, to help understand the notion of quantum
state in a relativistic framework, with the vertices of a graph being associated to spacetime events.
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